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1The Dynamics of Global-
Domestic Institutional 
Interaction in 
Postcommunist Russia and 
Elsewhere
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
King’s Russia Institute
King’s College London
Abstract: This study argues for the need to better 
integrate the role of international factors, specifically 
global financial institutions, in order to understand the 
roots of institutional failures in some post-communist 
countries, including Russia. It explores the differential 
nature of policy challenges facing Western democracies 
and authoritarian regimes regarding their participation in 
the globalized financial system.
Scholarly investigations into the roots of institutional success and failure of post-communist transformations contain an unintended and 
frequently unnoticed analytical bias. The analyses of successful cases 
of institutional transformation often highlight the role of international 
factors as crucial explanatory variables of achievement. For example, 
the idea of EU leverage in transforming institutions in countries that 
became EU members has been widely acknowledged and integrated 
into the mainstream understanding of successful transitions.1 The idea of 
geographical linkages and diffusion of ”good things” from the West has 
1Milada Anna Vachudova. 2005. Europe undivided: democracy, leverage, and integration 
after communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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been also deemed an important element of the democratization process.2 
Explanations of failures, on the other hand, rarely probe into international 
factors and tend to focus on domestic causation. The body of literature 
emphasizing the role of domestic factors in democratic and governance 
failures is rich, theoretically innovative and geographically diverse.3 But 
the discussion of how international or transnational factors could become 
part of “vicious cycles” in institutional transformation is only at its incep-
tion. Fortunately, this state of affairs is starting to change. The empirical 
research Karen Dawisha conducted while writing Putin’s Kleptocracy 
works to open this discussion by bringing to the table crucial data about 
the international linkages and dependencies of Russia’s top political and 
economic elites. 
The most recent revelations from the Panama Papers also work 
to shift the frame of reference with regard to the argued importance of 
linkages with the West for successful institutional transformation through 
learning, cultural transmission, and other elite and society-level chang-
es.4 On the contrary, an exploration of such factors as the degree of elite 
integration into the global economy and finance opens new avenues for 
comprehending the roots of institutional failure in some post-communist 
countries as well as other nations that might be attempting to improve their 
weak institutions in the context of unprecedented globalization of national 
economies and financial structures. Indeed, the new revelations about the 
role of global financial institutions position the west as nothing less than 
a facilitator of modern-day corruption.5 
The Panama Papers are just the latest confirmation of the extent 
to which tax avoidance and money laundering have become widespread 
around the world. Before the Panama Papers were the Luxembourg leaks; 
before the Luxembourg leaks, there was a Cyprus financial crisis that 
exposed tax evasion through Cypriot banks; still earlier was the Bank of 
New York scandal exposing money laundering from Russia; and even 
before that was FIMACO, a Jersey firm used by the KGB to funnel the 
2Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. 2006. “Linkage versus leverage. Rethinking the inter-
national dimension of regime change.” Comparative Politics, 38:4 (July): 379-400. Valerie 
J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2010. “Defeating dictators: Electoral change and stability 
in competitive authoritarian regimes.” World Politics 62:1 (January): 43-86.
3To cite just a few notable examples here:  Lucan Way. 2015. Pluralism by default: Weak 
autocrats and the rise of competitive politics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press; Henry E. Hale. 2014. Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative 
perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Steven M. Fish. 2005. Democracy 
derailed in Russia: The failure of open politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4Levitsky and Way, 2006
5Aditya Chakrabortty. 2016. “Corruption can no longer be dismissed as a developing world 
problem.” The Guardian, May 10. Accessed at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/
may/10/corruption-developing-world-problem-london-summit-panama-papers
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Soviet Union’s Communist party funds abroad.6 Additionally, there were 
numerous other cases related to the assets stolen by corrupt leaders such as 
Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines), Vladimir Montesinos (Peru), Sani Abacha 
(Nigeria), and Diepreye Alamieyeseigha (South Africa).7 In all these cases, 
the assets were hidden abroad – stashed away using foreign banks, offshore 
investment firms and lucrative real estate. Presently, almost every day we 
learn that the big Western corporations, banks, and investment companies, 
as well as the rich upper strata in the developing world, have been skillfully 
employing offshore financial zones to hide from taxes, state authorities, 
and potential raiders, sometimes using these financial institutions to 
launder proceeds from corruption and hide illicit profits by moving them 
into jurisdictions where the owners are given anonymity and non-trans-
parency. Undoubtedly, the growing evidence of such behavior has raised 
some uncomfortable questions about the ethical standards underpinning 
the global financial order, the eroding social contracts sustaining state-so-
ciety relations in the Western countries and the role of these transnational 
actors and mechanisms in supporting corruption and theft in the developing 
countries. It emerges that the Western financial institutions – not only in the 
notorious island-nations of Cyprus, British Virgin Islands or Bahamas, but 
in London, New York and Los Angeles – serve as a pillar of the system, 
linking corrupt, rent-based economies integrated into the global economy 
and developed countries with strong protection of property rights, compet-
itive political systems and social prosperity. 
I had the privilege of developing with Dr. Dawisha the analytical 
outlines of this argument in a co-authored article, “The Escape from 
Institution-Building in a Globalized World: Lessons from Russia” (forth-
coming in Perspectives on Politics). In this essay, I will summarize 
our argument that Russian asset-holders used practices of institutional 
arbitrage to make profits in Russia and secure their assets abroad, thus 
essentially avoiding the issue of domestic institutional reforms. I will 
support this argument based on the most recent data that has emerged since 
our manuscript was submitted for publication. 
Additionally, I will explore central policy dilemmas the Russian 
6For documents associated with Luxembourg leaks, see: http://cloudfront-files1.publicinteg-
rity.org/apps/2014/12/luxleaks/index.html; on Cyprus financial crisis, see Ned Resnikoff, 
“Cyprus disaster shines light on global tax havens,” MSNBC. Accessed at: www.msnbc.com/
the-ed-show/cyprus-disaster-shines-light-global-tax-ha; on Bank of New York scandal, see 
Timothy L. O’Brien, “Bank Settles U.S. Inquiry into Money Laundering,” New York Times 
November 9, 2005. Accessed at:
www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/business/bank-settles-us-inquiry-into-money-laundering.ht-
ml?_r=0; for the discussion of FIMACO, see Karen Dawisha. 2015. Putin’s Kleptocracy Who 
Owns Russia? New York: Simon and Schuster.
7Some of these assets were recovered through StAR – Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative by the 
World Bank and the UNODC (http://star.worldbank.org/star/) 
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government – and, arguably, other authoritarian regimes – has to face in 
relation to its globalized elites, as well as Western governments’ policy 
dilemmas as they confront the growing realization that the global financial 
industry (dominated by Western economic actors) is being widely discred-
ited by the practices of money-laundering and tax evasion: providing a 
shelter for dirty cash to dictators and corrupt elites from the developing 
countries, and assisting global corporations to circumvent domestic tax 
rules and regulations. I argue that these policy challenges vary across 
regime types and that forcing Western financial institutions to clean up 
their act  appears more likely than restraining economic actors from coun-
tries with unaccountable governments. 
Offshoring Wealth, Offshoring Loyalties 
Whether a regime is democratic or authoritarian, there is an evident conflict 
of public and private interests with regard to the opportunities provided by 
the global financial institutions. While the rich and powerful in both types 
of regime might be interested in securing their assets or avoiding higher 
taxes, in democracies, tax evasion goes against the basic social contract 
underpinning the operation of the state and the government. Therefore, 
as the public pressure on state officials increases, we could expect more 
policy initiatives designed to rein in financial abuse.  Such policy initia-
tives are already underway and we can expect gradual change and closing 
of loopholes used by multinational corporations (since the process of 
learning about the effectiveness of particular measures takes time). Thus, 
the synergy between growing public awareness and the regulatory changes 
promoted by the governmental and non-governmental agencies provides 
some hope that the culture of tax evasion by global corporations might be 
curtailed in the West.
In authoritarian systems, on the other hand, the government is inter-
ested in greater control over – and assuring the loyalty of – domestic elites, 
and is therefore opposed to institutional exit strategies enabled by foreign 
financial institutions and widely employed by domestic elites.  The actions 
of domestic elites in such systems are, driven not only by the logic of prof-
it-maximization (as in the case of Western firms evading taxes) but also by 
the defensive logic of asset securitization in the absence of domestic insti-
tutions protecting property rights. The demand for institutional escape is, 
arguably, even stronger than the logic of tax optimization and is manifested 
in the actions of top government leaders in countries like Russia, China, 
Kazakhstan and other relatively rich but non-democratic nations. Given the 
functional significance of foreign financial institutions for businesses in 
countries with weak institutions, it is not likely that the governments would 
follow through in their publicly declared de-offshorization campaigns 
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because it would mean increased capital flight and potential economic 
disaster. Furthermore, as illustrated by the case of Russia, corruption 
appears so routinized and normalized in some of these countries that even 
large scale, public revelations about top officials’ assets hidden abroad 
do not result in public outcry and pressure on the government. Therefore, 
the institutional exit strategies used by economic actors in such states are 
likely to continue, further entrenching these nations in an institutional 
trap whereby the ineffectiveness of domestic institutions, especially those 
concerned with property rights protection, is compensated for by foreign 
institutions.  
In our study with Karen Dawisha, we use the term “institutional 
arbitrage” to capture these practices and highlight their institutional impli-
cations. Institutional arbitrage refers to economic actors’ strategic use of 
institutions in different jurisdictions to meet their institutional needs at 
different points. In Russia, for example,  economic actors take advantage 
of the weak institutional environment to make super-profits, often relying 
on informal connections and corruption. Weak institutions and a corrupt 
rule-of-law system cannot protect economic assets well, however. So when 
assets need to be protected, Russian asset-holders find solutions abroad, in 
countries with strong traditions of the rule of law, impartial judiciary and 
reliable law enforcement institutions.
The source of wealth creation is not really significant when it comes 
to institutional arbitrage practices.  Whether businesses have relied on their 
personal connections or not, whether they have broken the law or have only 
used legal loopholes, having obtained their wealth, they all find themselves 
in a similar institutional environment, characterized by legal uncertainty 
and the potential threat of expropriation by the private or public sector. 
The use of other available means of securing property rights is a logical 
strategy in such conditions.
Karen Dawisha’s research brings to the forefront the idea that the 
strategy of securing funds abroad is not entirely new. Their origin dates to 
the management of the Soviet state reserves and the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) funds to which insider KGB and CPSU elites 
were allowed privileged access.8 With the growing political uncertainty 
and destabilization resulting from Gorbachev’s reforms, the insider party 
elites wanted to secure their future in case of the Soviet collapse and set 
up numerous offshore bank accounts, foreign companies, and real estate 
holdings that, according to one estimate, amounted to $50 billion of hidden 
assets.9 In her book, Dawisha also brings attention to Vladimir Putin’s 
activities in St. Petersburg in the 1990s, where, within a close circle of 
friends and as a head of the Committee for Foreign Liaison in the city 
8Dawisha, 2015, 20-21.
9Dawisha, 2015, 18-19.
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government, he was well positioned to become a mediator enabling local 
profit-making and securitization of assets abroad through Western finan-
cial and legal institutions.10 
Institutional arbitrage strategies developed further in the 1990s and 
became especially widespread in the 2000s, as foreign solutions became 
less costly and more available even to small and medium-size firms and 
companies and to regional and local-level state officials and politicians.11 
One estimate pointed out that between 70-90  percent of Russian compa-
nies formally belong to entities registered in offshore zones.12 The massive 
capital flight from Russia in the last quarter of the century is perhaps the 
clearest indicator of nascent Russian capitalists voting “with their feet” 
in response to political instability and insecure property rights in the new 
Russia. According to some estimates, 50 percent  of Russian capital is 
hidden offshore.13 The most recent estimate by the Tax Justice Network, 
a UK-based advocacy group concerned with tax avoidance issues, shows 
that by the end of 2014 $1.3 trillion of assets from Russia were “sitting 
abroad.”14 Some Russian estimates of capital outflows from the country 
amounted to $2 trillion.15 The emergence, in the 2000s, of the phenom-
enon of “round-trip” investors, who first transferred funds abroad and 
then brought them back into the country as foreign investments, was an 
important indicator of the growing dynamism of the Russian economy 
and the expansion of profit-making opportunities, especially for those 
well-connected with the government at various levels.16 But Russian capi-
talists’ reaction to Putin’s new adventures in foreign policy have also been 
revealing – when the shift began in 2014, Russia experienced an exodus of 
capital, with over $154 billion leaving the country in one year.17 
10Dawisha, 2015, chapter 2.
11Mark H. Gay. 2013. “Havens Retain Allure For Firms Seeking Flexibility Offshore,” The 
Moscow Times May 15. Accessed at: www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/havens-re-
tain-allure-for-firms-seeking-flexibility-offshore/480057.html
12Boris A. Kheyfets. 2010. “Antiofshornoe nastuplenie mirovogo soobshchestva i rossiyskaia 
politika,” Finansy i biudzhet: Problemy i reshenia. No. 2: 15. Accessed at: www.imepi-eur-
asia.ru/baner/finance.pdf
13Brooke Harrington, “”Rodnye ofshory.” The Esquire. Accessed at: esquire.ru/
brooke-harrington
14Heather Stewart. 2016. “Offshore finance: more than $12tn. siphoned out of emerging coun-
tries,” The Guardian, May 8. Accessed at: www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/08/
offshore-finance-emerging-countries-russia-david-cameron-summit
15“Capital flight from Russia halves in 2015 – Central Bank.” RT. Accessed at: www.rt.com/
business/321547-russia-capital-flight-drop/
16Svetlana Ledyaeva, Päivi Karhunen, and John Whalley. 2013. “If Foreign Investment is not 
Foreign: Round-Trip Versus Genuine Foreign Investment in Russia.” No. 2013-05. Accessed 
at: tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/tow/papers/ledyaeva-spring2013.pdf
17“Russia: Massive capital flight continues,” 2015. Moscow Times. May 1. Accessed at: www.
themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-massive-capital-flight-continues/520112.html
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With rising public pressure and international criticism of offshore 
banking and finance, and the promotion of new rules against money laun-
dering activities that have changed the ways banks operated in the past, 
asset holders who needed to hide their proceeds found another way.18  In 
the last few years, prime real estate markets in New York, London, Los 
Angeles, Miami and other attractive destinations have experienced an 
inflow of foreign capital, usually from secretive shell companies which 
hide the identities of those behind these purchases.19  A recent investiga-
tion into the condo owners in the Time Warner Center overlooking Central 
Park in Manhattan by journalists  from The New York Times  revealed a 
growing proportion of foreign owners, with at least 16 of them subject to 
government inquiries for various types of violations. Among these owners 
are foreign officials from Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Malayasia, and 
Mexico.20 The prime real estate market in London is similarly dominated 
by wealthy foreigners, with a particularly large share of Russian buyers.21 
The widespread reliance on foreign law in contract-writing and 
foreign courts in dispute resolution is another significant feature of 
institutional arbitrage. Specifically, the UK High Court, London Court 
of International Arbitration, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce and the High Court in Singapore have become 
important destinations for post-Soviet businessmen seeking an impartial 
legal system.  Besides the most notorious court cases – such as the one 
between Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich in 2012 – there are 
many others, smaller in scale, involving claimants from Russia and other 
post-Soviet countries. According to one estimate, 63 percent of cases heard 
in English courts between March 2014 and March 2015 were brought by 
overseas claimants.22 Portland Legal Disputes, an international law firm, 
analyzed High Court rulings between 2013 and 2014; they found that liti-
gants from Russia were second only to those from the United States, and 
were followed by claimants and defendants from Kazakhstan.23 
18On the evolution of the AML regime, see for example, Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman. 
2004.  Chasing Dirty Money. Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
19Louise Story and Stephanie Saul. 2015. “Towers of Secrecy: Stream of Foreign Wealth 
Flows to Elite New York Real Estate,” New York Times, February 7. Accessed at: www.
nytimes.com/2015/02/08/nyregion/stream-of-foreign-wealth-flows-to-time-warner-condos.
html?rref=collection%2Fnewseventcollection%2Fshell-company-towers-of-secrecy-real-es-
tate&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=rank&module=package&version=high-
lights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=0
20Story and Saul, Towers of Secrecy.
21Ed Caesar. 2015. “House of Secrets,” New Yorker June 1. Accessed at: www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2015/06/01/house-of-secrets
22Jane Croft. 2015. “Number of UK litigants fighting disputes in High Court rebounds,” The 
Financial Times, July 19. Accessed at: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/91836d22-2bd5-11e5-acfb-cb-
d2e1c81cca.html#axzz48MXA2z4w
23Jane Croft, Jane. 2014. “Three Quarters of Litigants in UK commercial court are foreign,” 
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In short, Russian capitalists are essentially global and, more often 
than not, Western-based, with their families’ futures planned outside 
Russia. These trends hold at the top echelons of power and wealth in 
Russia, at the middle echelons and even, to a certain extent, at the bottom, 
or local, level, where those with access to power and wealth turn to foreign 
institutions to securitize their assets and future.  It is ironic and revealing 
that Artem Chaika, the elder son of the prosecutor general Yuri Chaika, the 
state official at the helm of the rule of law system in Russia, clearly sees his 
future as being in the West. His Swiss residency permit and a big villa in 
Switzerland, recently brought to public attention by Navalny’s Foundation 
for Fighting Corruption (FBK) investigation, clearly indicates that making 
money in Russia does not mean living in Russia.24 The story of Artem 
Chaika is representative of many other children of the present Russian 
elite. The family of Vladimir Yakunin, ex-manager of Russian Railways 
(RZhD) is another case in point. Yakunin, Putin’s close associate from the 
1990s in St. Petersburg, lost his position in RZhD in 2015, allegedly due 
to his son’s application for British citizenship.25  Even if there were an 
alternative explanation for Yakunin’s demise, his son’s choice is suggestive 
of elite preferences and visions for the future.
At first glance, these elite preferences might not seem problematic. 
Indeed, they mesh with global trends and options open to other capi-
tal-holders around the world. After all, businesses are meant to make 
money, secure it and then, hopefully, invest back into the economy. Why 
should we care about the availability of such arbitrage opportunities to 
economic actors? The problems arise when one considers the institu-
tional implications of such opportunities for nations experiencing “capital 
flight.” The mainstream analysis of institutional evolution in established 
democracies has pointed to the crucial role of property owners in lobby-
ing the government for strong institutions.26 In older democracies, major 
asset-holders (whether land owners in England, bourgeoisie in France) 
have been essential to limiting the government and establishing credible 
commitment.27 The idea of private owners becoming champions of democ-
The Financial Times, May 29. Accessed at: www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4c33f0c0-e716-11e3-
88be-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3NDmTEx3R
24Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation investigation. Accessed at: https://fbk.info/se
arch/?q=%23%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BA%D0%B0
25Eva Hartog. 2015. “Yakunin Quit Russian Railways Over Son’s Wish to Become British 
Citizen,” Moscow Times October 11. Accessed at: www.themoscowtimes.com/business/arti-
cle/yakunin-quit-russian-railways-over-sons-wish-to-become-british-citizen--report/538362.
html
26For a classical statement of this argument, see Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. 
1989. “Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice 
in seventeenth-century England.” The journal of economic history 49.04: 803-832.
27Ibid.
Dynamics of Global-Domestic Institutional Interaction 9
ratization and institution-building was also foundational to reform efforts 
in the post-communist regions. Yet the anticipated collective action of elites 
was nowhere to be found. Instead, many nations were caught in a “partial 
reform equilibrium,” with early winners inhibiting institution-building 
and weakening nascent democratic systems.28 If these winners can take 
advantage of weak institutions and use foreign jurisdictions to securitize 
their assets, then the problems for institution-building become much more 
evident.  Post-communist economic actors simply operate within a set of 
incentives provided to them by the global and domestic economies.
The absence of elites that can pressure the government to improve 
institutional environment results in institutional degradation and facilitates 
an adverse selection process that enables asset-holders with strong political 
connections to structure the rules of the game to their benefit. The result-
ing economic concentration and monopolization, along with economic 
inefficiencies and undermined consumer interests, are among the negative 
consequences of such selection.   
Revealingly, Vladislav Surkov, the deputy chief of presidential 
administration and Putin’s political demiurge in the first decade of the 
2000s, noted once that Russia’s main problem is the absence of national-
ly-minded elites. He argued that the contemporary Russian ruling elite is 
more of an “offshore aristocracy” that deems Russia a “free hunting zone.” 
The members of this social group live abroad, educate their kids abroad, 
and treat Russia as a place from which they can extract profits, while 
their lives and aspirations are elsewhere.29 It could be added that contem-
porary economic elites in Russia are those with the closest links to the 
state. Another recent revelation is concerned with thousands of valuable 
real estate items around Moscow that belong to offshore companies. The 
journalists working for New Times revealed that 1,226 offshore companies 
own 6,743 pieces of real estate around Russia’s capital. Some of that real 
estate was formerly under the institutional control of the KGB/FSB as well 
as government dachas and resort palaces under the control of the Soviet 
Council of Ministers and other governmental agencies.30    
It is important to recognize that there are exceptions to this pattern 
and some Russian capitalists are undoubtedly more civic-minded, more 
committed to the country’s future, and more prone to lobbying for a more 
effective government and secure property rights than others. When Alexey 
28Joel S. Hellman. 1998. “Winners take all: the politics of partial reform in postcommunist 
transitions.” World politics 50.02: 203-234.
29Vladislav Surkov. 2006. “Suverenitet eto politicheskii sinonim konkurentosposobnosti,” 
speech at meeting of United Russia party school, February 7, 2006.  Accessed at: http://www.
politnauka.org/library/public/surkov.php
30“Rassledovanie New Times raskrylo tysiachi peredannykh ofshoram podmoskovnykh 
uchastkov,” May 16, 2016. Accessed at: newsru.com/russia/16may2016/ntinvestigation.html
10                             Demokratizatsiya
Navalny ran in the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections, a group of business-
men supported his bid and funded his Foundation for Fighting Corruption, 
openly challenging the Kremlin and the political establishment.31 Yet these 
exceptions do not negate the dominant trend of Russia’s big businesses 
staying silent, not interfering in politics and not challenging the Kremlin 
and its rules openly. Institutional arbitrage appears as a safer and less costly 
choice for the majority of Russian capitalists.   
The issue of Russian elite loyalties has come under some scrutiny in 
the last few years. Vladimir Putin himself, when asked about his daugh-
ters, has highlighted that they have been educated in Russia and continue 
to work and live there.32  Yet we also know now, as a result of a recent 
Reuters investigation (later expanded by RosBusinessConsulting – RBC 
Group journalists) that his daughters and their families belong to the 
privileged few, with high-value foreign property and other assets secured 
outside Russia.33 The sensitivity of this issue was highlighted when the 
senior managers of RBC Group were fired in May 2016, allegedly in 
response to publications about Putin’s palace in Gelendzhik, as well as 
the earlier publications about his family, particularly his son-in-law, Kirill 
Shamalov.34
Globalization and Authoritarian Regimes’ Predicament 
The practices of institutional arbitrage described above using the case of 
Russia are widespread in other parts of the world. Besides other post-So-
viet countries, such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and even the poorer states 
in Central Asia that witnessed the proliferation of these strategies, other 
developing nations face the same predicament.35 China is another great 
illustration of a country whose elites are increasingly vested abroad and 
whose government has repeatedly initiated anti-corruption campaigns, 
seeking ways to control offshorization processes and even hunting assets 
31Irina Filatova, 2013. 37 Businessmen Challenge Kremlin by Openly Backing Navalny.” 
Moscow Times. August 7.  Accessed at: www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/35-busi-
nessmen-openly-support-navalny/484204.html
32“Putin o docheriakh..” December 17, 2015. TASS. Accessed at: tass.ru/obschestvo/2537093
33Stephen Grey, Andrey Kuzmin, and Elizabeth Piper. 2015. “Comrade Capitalism: How 
Russia Does Business in the Putin Era,” Reuters, November 10. Accessed at: www.reu-
ters.com/investigates/special-report/russia-capitalism-daughters/. Irina Malkova and Ser-
gei Titov. 2015.  “Semeinye tsennosti.” December 18. Accessed at: http://www.rbc.ru/
society/18/12/2015/56bc89e79a7947299f72b745
34Anya Ardayeva. 2016. “Three Top Managers Leave Russia’s RBC Media.” Moscow Times, 
May 13. Accessed at: www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/three-top-managers-leave-
russias-rbc-media/569412.html. Natalia Rostova. 2016. “Could a union do anything to pro-
tect Russian journalists?” Accessed at: www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/nataliya-rostova/
could-trade-union-do-anything-to-protect-russian-journalists
35Alexander Cooley and J. C. Sharman. 2015. “Blurring the line between licit and illicit: trans-
national corruption networks in Central Asia and beyond.” Central Asian Survey 34.1: 11-28.
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and individuals overseas.36 Authoritarian regimes such as those of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and China have to balance their financial openness policies 
with concern for regime maintenance, domestic control and political and 
economic stability as well as control over their elites, who could presum-
ably escape from domestic control and move their entire capital abroad, 
undermining the economies of these countries.
Scholars have long noted new political challenges arising out of 
financial internationalization and increased capital mobility. The domi-
nant trend in this literature has been to highlight the changing power 
dynamic between the private actors and the state in favor of the private 
actors who now, allegedly, have a credible “exit” option and can demand 
a better business environment, lower taxes and better institutions, or else 
threaten the government with departure. Any government that normally 
depends on private investments for economic growth and development 
would therefore be more prone to cooperate with capital-holders capable 
of taking their capital elsewhere.37 Carles Boix, for example, has argued 
that the capital flight curbs redistributive pressures, forces governments 
to lower taxes, and reduces political conflict among capital holders and 
nonholders, thereby increasing the likelihood of democracy.38 Freeman and 
Quinn further developed this argument, showing that financially integrated 
autocracies are more likely to democratize.39  
Some scholars disagreed with these optimistic assessments. Cai 
and Treisman raised concerns about their unrealistic assumptions.40 
Logvinenko added to the debate by inquiring into authoritarian regimes’ 
choice for financial openness, linking it to the issue of regime survival and 
regime’s capacity to mitigate the effects of downside risks.41 Contrasting 
Russia’s financial openness with China’s more cautious and contradictory 
policies regarding financial flows, Logvinenko suggested that authoritar-
ian regimes have to balance the costs and benefits of financial openness; 
their extent of redistributive capacity might be responsible for the degree 
to which they might be willing to integrate into global financial markets. 
36Juliette Garside and David Pegg. 2016. “Panama papers reveal offshore secrets of China’s 
red nobility.” The Guardian. April 6. Accessed at: www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/06/
panama-papers-reveal-offshore-secrets-china-red-nobility-big-business
37Robert H. Bates and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien. 1985. “A Note on Taxation, Development and 
Representative Government,” Politics and Society 14: 53-70.
38Carles Boix. 2003. Democracy and redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 3.
39John R. Freeman and Dennis P. Quinn. 2012. “The economic origins of democracy recon-
sidered.” American Political Science Review 106.01: 58-80.
40Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman. 2005. “Does competition for capital discipline govern-
ments? Decentralization, globalization, and public policy.” The American Economic Review 
95.3: 817-830.
41Igor Logvinenko. 2016. “Open Economies, Closed Polities: Financial Openness in Russia 
and China,” Paper prepared for the 2016 ISA meeting, March 16-19, Atlanta, USA.
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Looking at Russia and China, Logvinenko argued that Russia’s choice of 
financial integration was assisted by the presence of a massive, welfare-
state-based redistributive capacity inherited from the Soviet era, which 
helps mitigate the effects of economic and financial crises that could 
otherwise prove fatal to the regime. Such capacity is not available in China, 
where the government has relied more on repressive than redistributive 
means of regime maintenance – hence, the Chinese government has been 
more cautious in reaping the benefits of financial integration.42  
The findings from our research with Karen Dawisha also run counter 
to the assessments that financial internationalization and integration 
empowers capital-holders vis-à-vis the state and increases the likelihood 
of democratization. In the case of Russia, financial internationalization 
evolved hand in hand with growing authoritarianism, an increasing use of 
repressive methods of political control, and reduced freedoms and liberties 
for the Russian population. Dawisha’s Putin’s Kleptocracy, in fact, leads 
to questioning the liberal model of capitalism that assumes separation of 
political and economic interests, and suggests that the choice for financial 
openness might have been linked to the private interests of those closest 
to power and profits, those who could take advantage of the weak institu-
tional environment in Russia and were interested in securing their ill-gotten 
capital in safe havens. Indeed, as noted by many other scholars, Russia’s 
post-Soviet capitalism (often dubbed “crony capitalism”) is inherently 
political in nature and business ties to the state have been crucial for 
economic success.43 Arguably, political connections have become even 
more consequential during Putin’s presidency as the regime worked to 
curb political and economic competition. In May 2016, The Economist 
published the “crony capitalist index,” placing Russia on top, far ahead of 
next-ranked Malaysia and Philippines, with Ukraine in 5th place.44  
Importantly, even while building authoritarian Russia and enhancing 
mechanisms of domestic political control, Putin expressed strong support 
for international economic integration and, in his first two terms in power, 
systematically followed that agenda.  Russia negotiated joining the WTO, 
42Ibid. It is indicative that even in China following a more cautious approach to financial 
integration, the practices of institutional arbitrage appear popular as manifested in vast capital 
outflows and offshore property investments. Indeed, Chinese and Russian buyers are often 
competing in the global luxury real estate market.
43For a structural argument about the origins of such capitalism, see Venelin Ganev. 2007. 
Preying on the state: the transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
44To produce this index The Economist used the measure of billionaire wealth as a percent of 
GDP, ranked by crony-sector wealth (with crony sectors including casinos, banking, energy, 
defense, utilities and telecoms, ports and airports, real estate and construction, infrastructure 
and pipelines, coal, timber and palm oil, steel and other metals). Accessed at: www.economist.
com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/05/daily-chart-2
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lobbied for OECD membership, and took steps to comply with Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) regulations. In his 2003 annual address to the 
Federal Assembly he argued, that 
No country today, no matter how big and how wealthy, can develop 
successfully in isolation from the rest of the world. On the contrary, the 
biggest success comes to those countries that consciously use their energy 
and intelligence to integrate themselves into the world economy.45
Supported by high prices for oil and gas, the Russian economy 
benefitted from foreign trade, foreign investments (though many of these 
were “round-trip” investments) and access to global financial markets. 
This pro-integration stance remained strong even after the 2008 financial 
crisis that resulted in Russia’s economy contracting more than that of any 
other G20 country.46  
The dominant pro-globalization discourse shifted around 2012 
with Putin’s third presidential term. The new, anti-globalization turn was 
vocalized by Vladimir Yakunin, Putin’s old friend, who actively promoted 
anti-Western conspiracy theories and, in 2015, denounced globalization 
and particularly the global financial system as “a tool of the global finan-
cial oligarchy to rob developing nations and create a system of global U.S. 
dominance.”47 Policy-wise, the government’s attention was focused on the 
issue of offshorization of the Russian economy. In his 2012 annual address 
to the Federal Assembly, Putin launched a de-offshorization campaign 
banning government officials from holding financial assets abroad and 
pointing to the “need [for] a comprehensive system of measures to reverse 
the offshoring of our economy.”48 He complained that Russian businesses 
conduct their transactions under foreign, not Russian law, calling to improve 
“the improper elements in our own judicial system, in our law-making, 
in our law enforcement practices.”49 These rhetorical statements were later 
bolstered by a new “de-offshorization” law that introduced a concept of a 
controlled foreign company (CFC) and obliged all Russian tax residents 
(individuals or companies) holding more than 10 percent in CFCs (any 
trusts, partnerships, foreign corporations and funds) to declare and, starting 
in 2015, pay taxes on their income.50
45Vladimir Putin. 2003. “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.” 
Accessed at: en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21998 
46Nigel Gould-Davies. 2016. “Russia’s sovereign globalization: rise, fall and future,” 
16-17. Accessed at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/
research/20160106RussiasSovereignGlobalizationGouldDaviesFinal.pdf
47Vladimir Yakunin. 2015. “Globalizatsiia i kapitalizm.” Razvitie i ekonimika #13, July. 
Accessed at: devec.ru/almanah/13/1846-vladimir-jakunin-globalizatsija-i-kapitalizm.html
48Gould-Davies 
49Vladimir Putin. 2012. “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.” 
Accessed at: en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864
50“CFC rules: towards the deoffshorisation of the Russian economy?” Accessed at: www.
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In an additional move to repatriate capital taken abroad in the last 
two decades, the Russian government adopted in 2015 a new “capital 
amnesty” law that promised a “free pass” on a range of legal, tax and 
administrative violations to businesses declaring their foreign assets 
to Russian authorities. However, this law did not produce the reaction 
expected; there are few cases of companies or individuals who used this 
law and registered their holdings in Russia.51 Most analysts noted that the 
main requirement for the law to work – a degree of trust that the govern-
ment can credibly commit to its promises – is absent. The government 
instead focused on more technical issues that might be hindering the law’s 
effectiveness, introducing amendments to the CFC law and extending the 
capital amnesty until July 1, 2016. 
These recently-initiated policies show that the Russian government 
seems to be starting to act on the problems of offshores and tax avoid-
ance. The low oil prices and foreign sanctions that deprived the Russian 
businesses of the access to foreign capital markets have created power-
ful incentives to work in this direction. Yet the effectiveness of these 
measures and the rhetoric appears highly questionable. From numerous 
informational leaks, we have learned that even those closest to Putin hide 
their assets in offshore accounts and jurisdictions. Recently, Putin’s friend 
Sergei Roldugin – himself linked to massive offshore accounts – was 
dubbed a “secret caretaker” of Putin’s own fortunes.52 It is unrealistic to 
anticipate that this trend is likely to change any time soon given that those 
closest to Russia’s president are the worst offenders.
In short, even when globalization is seen as a threat to state sover-
eignty and political stability and when anti-globalization discourse is 
used for ideological purposes, authoritarian regimes, at least in the case 
of Russia, could stay closely linked to international financial and legal 
structures. These linkages are mostly at the level of rich individuals and 
private firms that rely on foreign institutions to safeguard the capital 
usually extracted from the domestic economy and society, often through 
illegal means. The growing realization of this “dark side” of global finance 
– sparked by increasing evidence, most recently from the Panama Papers 
financierworldwide.com/cfc-rules-towards-the-deoffshorisation-of-the-russian-economy/#.
VztlDGaMF-w
“New Russian ‘anti-offshore’ law means changes for Russian treaties and real estate owners,” 
PWC. November 20, 2014. Accessed at: www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publications/
insights/assets/pwc-russian-anti-offshore-law-changes-russian-treaties.pdf
51According to experts, only around 200 people have used this law in 2015. See “Amnistiia 
kapitala budet usovershenstvovana i prodlena – deputat Gosdumy ot Voronezhskoi oblasti.” 
December 21, 2015. Accessed at: abireg.ru/n_50911.html
52Roman Anin, Olesya Shmagun, and Dmitry Velikovksiy, “Panama Papers: The Secret Care-
taker.” Accessed at: www.occrp.org/en/panamapapers/the-secret-caretaker/
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leakage, and growing public attention to these issues – will undoubtedly 
raise the need for policy actions on the part of Western democracies 
implicated in being a conduit for illicit funds. But how has the reaction of 
Western governments been so far?         
Offshores and Western Democratic Dilemmas 
The growing revelations about tax avoidance through offshore financial 
zones have become politically important for Western countries in at least 
two ways. On the one hand, the extent of these practices and the involve-
ment of top government officials work to undermine the very basis of the 
social contract linking the state and society in the West.  After all, paying 
taxes in exchange for public goods provision is the cornerstone of the 
liberal vision of the state. If top state officials, global corporations or other 
wealthy economic actors can exit this contract, hiding their assets or opti-
mizing their taxes by shifting profits to low- or no-tax locations and leaving 
the rest of the society to pay for the state, the very foundations of the 
democratic system appear undermined and the social contract discredited. 
Quick resignations of top officials in Iceland and Spain in the aftermath of 
the Panama Papers scandal and calls for resignation in Pakistan as well as 
the pressure exerted on British prime minister David Cameron  all suggest 
that officials will be held responsible, at least in democratic and politically 
competitive systems of governance. These pressures will necessitate addi-
tional policy response on the part of the Western governments to regulate 
and potentially restrict the special economic zones offering opportunities 
for tax avoidance.  
The second important revelation from the recent Panama leaks 
concerns the issue of corruption. More often than not, corruption has been 
seen as something that afflicts the non-Western, poor countries. When it 
happens in the West, it is more of an exception, with perpetrators held 
accountable for their actions and the system reformed to deal with exist-
ing loopholes. The ever more evident role of offshores in illicit financial 
flows, however, has highlighted the supply side of corruption: there are 
thousands of lawyers, bankers, corporate officials, real estate agents and 
other economic actors in the West who benefit from the widespread prac-
tices of securing assets in special financial zones that provide secrecy and 
anonymity to their account holders. The Western financial institutions 
work to enable and facilitate these flows and, arguably, the extent of 
corruption afflicting the developing countries is partially linked to these 
new opportunities for hiding wealth abroad. This point was vocalized by 
the Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari at the recent May 2016 Global 
Anti-Corruption Summit in London, where he suggested that corruption is 
“a hydra-headed monster. It does not differentiate between developed and 
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developing countries.”53 Indeed, the Nigerian government has long been 
working to repatriate from the West the assets stolen by Sani Abacha and 
is keenly aware of the difficulties and costliness of this process.54 At the 
Global Anti-Corruption Summit itself , Western public officials openly 
admitted the global nature of corruption for the first time and expressed 
openness to considering the role of the West in these processes.
Nonetheless, this most recent outcry related to tax avoidance through 
offshore jurisdictions has been just one event in a string of similar revela-
tions. The Western countries, and particularly those that occupy the more 
dominant positions in the global financial markets – the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Switzerland – have become keenly aware of the 
necessity of ensuring the integrity of the global financial system, espe-
cially in the face of widespread manipulation and abuse of the system for 
money-laundering and tax evasion purposes. In response to such financial 
crimes, Western governments, along with international organizations, such 
as the World Bank, the OECD and the IMF, have initiated a new body of 
laws and regulations now known as anti-money laundering (AML) rules. 
These rules began with the adoption in the United States of the Bank 
Secrecy Act (1970) and Money Laundering Control Act (1986), and have 
since been enhanced by numerous other domestic and international rules 
and regulations dealing with financial crimes. The more recent concerns 
for terrorism financing have added political weight to such legislation. The 
body of rules aimed at countering financial abuse is now referred to as the 
International Framework for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT).55 
Starting in 2013, the developed countries articulated a new policy 
issue, bringing attention to international tax evasion by multinational 
corporations and referring to “base erosion and profit-shifting” (BEPS) – 
defined as “tax planning strategies that exploit these gaps and mismatches 
in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations, where 
there is little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no overall 
corporate tax being paid.”56 The OECD has prepared a final BEPS package 
of reforms of the international tax system that included fifteen “actions” 
designed to deal with various aspects of international tax avoidance. 57  In 
53The full text of his speech can be accessed here: www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/
ogp-webmaster/2016/05/11/full-text-buhari’s-speech-anti-corruption-summit-london
54Morgan Winsor. 2016. “Nigeria, Switzerland Agree On Returning $321 
M in Stolen Abacha Funds,” March 9, 2016. Accessed at: ibtimes.com/
nigeria-switzerland-agree-returning-321m-stolen-abacha-funds-2333157
55See IMF, “Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). 
Accessed at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/
56See OECD,  “About BEPS and the inclusive framework.” Accessed at:  http://www.oecd.
org/ctp/beps-about.htm 
57Final reports can be accessed here: www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/beps-2015-final-reports.
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2016, the OECD countries have agreed that all interested countries and 
jurisdictions can join these efforts and the new “Platform for Collaboration 
on Tax” was announced in April 2016, with the first meeting of the BEPS 
framework planned for June 2016, in Kyoto, Japan. 
In short, the Western governments, supported by international 
organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD, do seem to have 
intensified their efforts in changing the rules of the system so as to 
curtail the practices of financial abuse. Given the history of these efforts, 
however, it is clear that no immediate and dramatic changes are likely.  At 
the same time, growing public awareness and continuous public pressure 
in relation to these challenges appear very important both for continuing 
governmental policy efforts and, crucially, for a gradual shift in the norms 
underpinning the practices of global corporations. The extent to which the 
policy changes discussed above will deal with the problem of corruption 
originating in developing countries and facilitated by Western actors and 
institutions is also questionable. The likelihood of more positive changes in 
authoritarian regimes arguably depends more on domestic political mobi-
lization and action. Unfortunately, the piecemeal approach to reforming 
the global financial system (perhaps the only approach possible without 
bringing the system to a halt) led by advanced industrialized democracies 
will not remove the institutional “exit” option from the strategies available 
to domestic elites in authoritarian states, thus diminishing the likelihood 
that they will express a preference for “voice” through political action.58 
htm
58For the explicit application of Albert Hirschman’s ideas of exit and voice from his 1970. 
Exit, voice and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Vol. 25. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, see Gulnaz Sharafutdinova and Karen Dawisha, 
“The Escape from Institution-Building in a Globalized World: Lessons from Russia,” Per-
spectives on Politics, forthcoming.
